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1. Introduction 
The ever increasing influence of the Chinese economy on the world stage has meant that the analysis 
of monetary policy and the actions of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) have received a great deal 
of attention, from both academics and policy makers.  Studies of monetary policy in the People 
Republic of China (PRC) have generally used the standard model of monetary policy analysis.  In the 
canonical New Keynesian (NK) models, monetary policy rules take the form of the Taylor rule 
(1993).  In the Taylor rule, the central bank sets the interest rate as a function of inflation and the 
output gap (or unemployment rate) by linking the monetary policy instrument to deviations of 
inflation from its target and of output from its potential.   In its simplest form, the rule implies that 
positive deviations in the inflation gap, or the output gap, would lead to a tightening monetary stance.  
The traditional rule often uses an interest rate or an exchange rate channel to examine the dynamics of 
a central bank’s monetary policy stance.  For example, an increase in the interest rate would raise the 
cost of investment and therefore reduce aggregate demand.  Similarly, an appreciation of the domestic 
currency would make exports more expensive and therefore reduce aggregate demand (Rudebusch 
2006).  
Standard economic models such as the Taylor rule are often not applicable to the PRC 
however.  This is because of the unique characteristics of the Chinese economy, namely with regard 
to the role of the government and the structure and philosophy of the central bank.  This makes the 
measurement of the PRC’s monetary policy stance notoriously difficult.  There have also been a large 
number of institutional changes and reforms which make the modelling of Chinese monetary policy 
cumbersome. The PRC has embarked on a series of bold reforms of its financial sector since 1980 to 
make the exchange rate more flexible; expand the interbank money, bond, and stock markets; open 
the banking sector to more competition; and liberalize interest rates (IMF 2014).  Meanwhile, the 
PRC’s monetary policy has historically been exercised through quantity controls on bank lending and 
direct instruments guided by monetary aggregate targets (Laurens and Maino 2007).  This further 
complicates an estimation of a stable monetary policy rule. 
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 The PBOC operates under the dual mandate of ‘maintaining the stability of the currency and 
thereby promoting economic growth’. While these objectives are similar to that of most central banks 
in advanced economies, the instruments that the Chinese central bank use to achieve these targets are, 
in themselves, quite unique.  Table 1 gives a brief outline of the main tools at the disposal of PBOC.   
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Since the PBOC has adopted a wide range of monetary policy instruments over the last three 
decades, including price based instruments, quantity based instruments and administrative 
instruments, it is likely that no single variable can be used to adequately capture their monetary policy 
stance.  Unlike many advanced monetary authorities, the PBOC has been more reluctant to use the 
interest rate as an operating target, instead setting intermediate targets for money supply growth and 
the exchange rate1.  Consequently, using a standard “Taylor type” monetary policy rule would not be 
appropriate.   Another potential problem is the widespread economic and political change the 
economy has experienced in the last twenty years.  Consequently, studies of the Chinese economy 
often suffer from the problem of structural breaks, asymmetry and non-linearity in the time series. 
These issues have been well documented in the literature (see for example Chang et al. 2015, You and 
Sarantis 2012, Chen et al. 2011).  This can make a stable model of monetary policy very difficult to 
estimate.  Moreover, as is typical in a transition economy, some important features, such as the 
shifting preferences and nonlinearities of policymakers' choices, might play an important role in 
monetary policy conduct, and a thorough understanding of the PRC's monetary policy will not emerge 
unless these special characteristics have been effectively taken into account.  Therefore, this paper 
will estimate a set of augmented monetary policy “Taylor type” equations using a monetary policy 
index (MPI) in place of the interest rate.   This equation is then estimated in a Markov switching 
framework. The exchange rate is also included as the PBOC’s intermediate target.   Making the 
necessary adjustments to account for the specifics of the Chinese economy and its central banking 
                                                          
1 The crawling peg which China adopts is often seen to play a very important role within the Chinese monetary 
policy framework (Geiger 2008).   
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system, the paper aims to improve the understanding of how the PBOC reacts to its main policy target 
variables. 
 
2. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) & Chinese Monetary Policy 
2.1  Brief History of PBOC 
From 1950 to 1978, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) was the only bank in the PRC and was 
responsible for both central and commercial banking.  Before the Chinese economy “opened up” in 
1978, the financial and banking system operated under an almost entirely centralised philosophy.  
With the introduction of economic reforms, pioneered by Deng Xiaoping, four “independent” banks 
were established in 1984 to carry out the commercial functions of the PBOC.  These four banks 
however, remained under the remit of the state and so were “independent” in name but not in nature.  
In the early 1990’s, problems arose with these commercial banks in the form of huge amounts of non-
performing loans due to a culture of policy lending, with “the big four”2 being encouraged to support 
often inefficient state owned companies.  In January 19943, the Chinese authorities introduced three 
new policy banks4 to disburden the commercial banks from the problem of policy lending mentioned 
above.  Prior to 1994, the intermediate targets adopted by the PBOC had been currency in circulation 
and the portfolio of commercial bank loans.  The PBOC also began to release the statistical data for 
money supply in this year and gradually took it as the intermediate target with the introduction and 
definition of three new indicators.5   At the time, the interest rate was not (and still has not, as of 
2015) totally liberated and did not serve as the operation target of PRC’s monetary policy.   
While the State Council announced that the PBOC would function solely as a central bank in 
1983, its central bank status was not legally confirmed until March 1995 at the 3rd Plenum of the 8th 
                                                          
2 These are the Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), The Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC) and the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
3 The estimation period of this paper begins in 1994, which corresponds conveniently to important institutional 
changes and reforms in the Chinese financial and banking system.   
4 The three policy banks being Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), China Development Bank 
(CDB), and the Export-Import Bank of China (Chexim) 
5 M0, M1 & M2 
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National People’s Congress.  Since the law officially acknowledged the PBOC as the central bank of 
the PRC on the 1st of July 1995, many private banks have been established as well as foreign 
subsidiaries after the ascension into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001.  1997 saw the 
establishment of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), the consultative body of the PBOC assigned 
to formulate, adjust and set targets for monetary policy.  However, the MPC of the PBOC is very 
different from the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England and the Open Markets 
Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve, as it only advises on monetary policy rather than 
determines it. The State Council has the ultimate power to decide the substantial monetary policy 
measures (Long 2012).   Therefore, many of the PBOC’s objectives were, and are still, established 
directly by the government.  In 1998, the PBOC underwent major restructuring and all the former 
provincial and local branches were abolished.  In lieu of these, the PBOC opened nine regional 
branches in Tianjin Shenyang, Shanghai, Nanjing, Jinan, Wuhan, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Xi'an.  In 
2003, the 10th National People’s Congress strengthened the institution even further by approving laws 
and amendments which gave the PBOC more power in implementing monetary policy for 
safeguarding the overall stability of the economy and the provision of financial services.  This 
coincided with the establishment of the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) which was 
established to regulate and supervise the commercial banking sector.  These amendments conclusively 
defined the PBOC as the central bank we see today and the organizational system was also specified6.   
 
2.2 Examining the Reactions of the PBOC 
Despite the reforms in the banking sector and the increased autonomy that the monetary authority 
now possess, examining the monetary policy reactions of the PBOC using standard macroeconomic 
models is hindered by a number of factors.  As mentioned, the PBOC does not exclusively use the 
interest rate as an operating instrument, opting instead to set intermediate targets for both money 
supply and the exchange rate. This makes the standard Taylor rule estimation inappropriate in the 
                                                          
6 For a definitive outline of the structure of the PBOC see Geiger (2008) 
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Chinese case.  Secondly, identifying the instruments used by the PBOC to conduct monetary policy is 
difficult. Girardin et al. (2014) point to three main categories of policy instrument employed by the 
PBOC; 1) Price based instruments (such as interest rates on bank deposits and lending, excess 
reserves etc. 2) Quantity based instruments (such as reserve requirement ration (RRR)) and 3) 
Administrative instruments such as ‘window guidance’, which of course are difficult to estimate or 
model as they are not directly observable. Window guidance can be defined as exercising controls on 
bank lending.  In the PRC, this takes the form of the central government setting the direction for 
sector development and for stimulating growth of certain industries - often propping up ineffective 
and inefficient state owned enterprises, thus denying more efficient private corporations investment.   
Finally, there is the issue of identifying structural breaks in the Chinese economic data, which is 
symptomatic of an economy which has changed and reformed its institutions rapidly in a relatively 
short period of time.  These have included changes in structures of government organisations such as 
those of the PBOC, indicative of an economy in transition.  Structural changes in an economy and 
breaks in its time series make standard linear models infective for empirical interpretation as they can 
lead to incorrect inferences.  Therefore, non-linear estimations need to be carried out to get a more 
accurate representation of monetary policy dynamics in the PRC. 
The paper is structured as follows.   Section 3 reviews the literature on the monetary policy rule, 
the asymmetry of monetary policy reactions and on monetary policy in the PRC.  Section 4 gives a 
brief overview of the methodology while Section 5 describes the data and a detailed description of our 
estimated monetary policy index.  Section 6 presents the estimations and results and performs 
robustness tests on the results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.  
 
3.  Literature Review 
The Taylor rule (1993) has been used for many years to examine monetary policy in advanced 
economies such as the US (Bernanke 2010 and Taylor 2009), The UK (Clarida et al. 1999 and 
McCallum 2000) and the Euro area (Peersman and Smets 1999 and Gerlach-Kristen 2003).  In its 
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most common and basic form, the Taylor rule links monetary policy rates dynamically to the 
deviation of inflation from its target rate and output (or unemployment) from its natural level.  
In more recent studies, academics and policy makers have focused on the asymmetry and 
non-linearity in monetary policy reactions.  A central bank may respond differently to deviations of 
aggregates from their targets depending on factors such as the current phase of the business cycle 
(Castro 2008).  In this case, it would be more appropriate to model either a structural change or a non-
linear type Taylor rule to explain the behaviour of monetary policy.  Kim and Nelson (2006) employ a 
time-varying parameter model to examine US monetary policy since the 1950’s and fInd that the 
reaction was indeed unstable.  Davig and Leeper (2007) use a similar technique to the one employed 
in this paper by specifying that the reaction of coefficients in the monetary policy rule evolve 
according to a Markov process.    Dolado et al. (2005) and Surico (2007a, 2007b) have shown 
evidence that central banks respond differently to deviations of inflation and output from their target 
levels.  Hamilton (1989) also makes the point that inflation and output gaps tend to have an 
asymmetric adjustment to the business cycle.  For example, recessions tend to be sharp, while 
recoveries are longer and smoother.  Inflation on the other hand usually increases more rapidly than it 
decreases.  Markov (2012), using a regime switching Taylor rule for the Euro area, finds that the main 
ECB policy rate switched between two regimes.  The first regime emphasised stabilising the 
economic outlook of the Euro area, while the second, more aggressive regime, put a greater emphasis 
on real output growth expectations.  Murray et al. (2013) estimate a Taylor rule with endogenous 
Markov switching coefficients and variance for the US to correspond with the tenure of various 
Federal Reserve Chairmen. They found that while the Federal Reserve consistently adhered to the 
Taylor rule before 1973 and after 1984, it followed the Taylor rule from 1975-1979 and did not follow 
the Taylor rule from 1980-1984.  Castro (2008) examines if major central banks are following a linear 
or nonlinear (augmented) Taylor rule.  The author finds that the ECB and the Bank of England tend to 
follow a nonlinear Taylor rule but the same is not true for the Federal Reserve. Hofmann and 
Bogdanova (2012) also state that there has been a symmetric reaction of monetary policy to the 
different stages of the financial cycle in core advanced countries. 
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The Taylor rule has also become increasingly popular as a gauge for assessment of emerging market 
economies (EME’s). Taylor (2000) himself states that the use of monetary policy rules in EME’s has 
many of the same benefits that have been found in research and in practice in developed countries.  
He adds the caveat, however, that market conditions in emerging market economies may require 
modifications of the typical policy rules that have been recommended with more developed financial 
markets in mind.  While the focus of nonlinear monetary policy rule models have been taken by the 
US, the UK and the Euro area, there have been fewer studies of the asymmetric effects of monetary 
policy in emerging markets such as the PRC.  This is surprising as emerging economies are often 
characterised by ongoing reforms, political and economic changes, market liberalisation etc. which 
would make standard linear estimations such as OLS inappropriate for analysing monetary policy.  
Jawadi et al. (2011) argue that for emerging markets, a nonlinear Taylor rule may give a more realistic 
description of the response of the monetary authority to economic development as it allows the 
analysis of asymmetric, discontinuous and time varying monetary policy reaction.  
Although many studies have noted that interest rates in the Chinese economy have played a 
minor role (for example Laurens and Maino 2007, Mehrotra 2007 and Koivu 2009),  Wang and 
Handa (2007) find that the PBOC followed a Taylor type rule for the interest rate with the aim of 
inflation targeting and output smoothing during their estimation period of 1993-2003.  Burdekin and 
Silkos (2008) model Chinese monetary policy with an augmented McCallum-type rule that takes into 
account the People's Bank of China's emphasis on targeting the rate of money supply growth.  Using 
cointegration analysis, the authors find that Chinese inflation and monetary policy outcomes seem 
reasonably captured using a standard monetary approach without the need to appeal to China-specific 
“structural” factors.  Using data from 1994-2006, Li and Wang (2010) find that the Taylor rule is 
unstable in China.  The authors claim that there is less correlation found between the interest rate and 
the output gap and that the PBOC focuses more on the inflation target than economic growth.  Kong 
(2008) compares four kinds of monetary policy rules for China, including a Taylor and McCallum 
rule.  The author finds that these models can describe the Chinese monetary policy stance in some 
degree and that Taylor rules are better than McCallum rules in evaluating monetary policy 
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performance.  In a more recent paper, Fernald et al. (2014) make the very interesting finding that 
China’s monetary policy transition mechanism is closer to those of Western economies than 
previously realized.     
 Early work in the area of the asymmetry of the Chinese monetary policy rule was carried out 
by Lu and Shu (2002).  The authors divided their entire sample using pre specified breakpoints.  
However, the pre-specification of breakpoints in this manner is arbitrary and often suffers from poor 
model specification.  Chen and Huo (2009) is one of few papers to tackle the issue of asymmetry and 
instability in the Chinese Taylor rule by estimating a model with drifting coefficients.  The authors, 
however, fail to account for the role of qualitative instruments which is believed to play a very 
important role in Chinese monetary policy framework (Goodfriend and Prasard 2007).  Studying a 
modified Chinese Taylor’s rule with money supply growth rate as the intermediate target, the authors 
do find however that there were two structural changes in the Chinese monetary policy rule, which 
take the form of discrete jumps rather than continuous adjustments.  In their concluding remarks, the 
authors state that it may be better to use the Markov regime switching model to estimate the Chinese 
monetary policy rule.  Zheng et al. (2012) found that China's monetary policy can be well 
characterized by a two-regime forward-looking Taylor rule. They find that in the first regime, the 
PBOC targets inflation, but does not focuses on the output gap; while in the second regime the central 
bank targets the output gap and the policy rule is not characterised by a stable framework.  Based on 
the relatively scarce literature, Ma (2014) has pointed out that there are major gaps waiting to be ﬁlled 
in the study of China's monetary policy.  For example, the author mentions the existing studies that 
investigate China's monetary policy have implicitly assumed a price rule, especially a Taylor-type 
interest rate rule. This may not be appropriate to the Chinese case for the reasons mentioned.  The 
lack of accountability of nonlinearities is also mentioned by the author. 
The issue of asymmetry and non-linearity in monetary policy rule estimations is not just a 
Chinese specific one.  Many transition and emerging market economies experience structural breaks 
and nonlinearities when it comes to the monetary policy reactions of its central banks as they react to 
the ever changing conditions of the macro economy. From the perspective of a typical transition 
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economy, some important features of monetary policy in transition, such as shifting preferences and 
nonlinearities of policymakers' choices, have been largely ignored in the existing literature.  However, 
as noted by Hamilton (1989) and Surico (2007a), central banks may have asymmetric preferences in 
reality, which gives rise to the existence of a nonlinear monetary policy reaction function.  Therefore, 
it is important to examine closely the specific preferences and policy’s adopted by these central banks 
in emerging market economies. 
 
3. Methodology  
Taylor characterised monetary policy in the US from 1987-1992 using Equations 1.1 and 1.2, which 
became known as the Taylor rule; 
𝑖𝑡 =  ?̅?𝑡 +  𝜋𝑡 +  𝑏(𝜋𝑡 −  𝜋𝑡
∗) + 𝑐(?̅?𝑡)       (1.1) 
Which can be simplified to 
𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎 + (1 + 𝑏)𝜋𝑡 + 𝑐(?̅?𝑡)        (1.2) 
In these equations, 𝑖𝑡 represents the nominal short term interest rate, ?̅? is the equilibrium level of the 
real interest rate, 𝜋𝑡 is the inflation rate, 𝜋
∗ is the target inflation rate and finally ?̅?𝑡 is the deviation of 
output from its natural level, i.e., the output gap.  Taylor (1993) and later Woodford (2003) state that 
since the real interest rate drives private decisions, the size of the inflation coefficient, 𝑏, needs to 
ensure that the nominal interest rate is raised enough to increase the real interest rate as a response to a 
rise in the inflation.  This so called “Taylor principle” implies that 𝑏 should be greater than 1.  On the 
other hand, if 𝑏 is less than 1 it indicates an accommodative behaviour on the part of the monetary 
authority to inflation which may result in self-reinforcing inflation.  In parallel, the coefficient of the 
output gap, 𝑐, should be positive.  The suitability of the Taylor rule of the form in Equation 1.1 and 
1.2 can be tested empirically for the PRC using the following interest rate backward-looking Taylor 
monetary reaction function (similar to that used in Girardin et al. 2014) which also includes the 
exchange rate as a monetary policy target variable; 
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𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏(𝜋𝑡−1 −  𝜋𝑡
∗) + 𝑐(?̅?𝑡−1) + 𝑑∆𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡     (2) 
 
In the above equation, 𝑖𝑡 is the PBOC lending rate, ( 𝜋𝑡−1 −  𝜋𝑡
∗)is the CPI inflation rate minus a 
target level of inflation, ?̅?𝑡 is the deviation of output from its natural or potential level, referred to 
simply as the output gap, and finally ∆𝑒𝑟𝑡 is changes in the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER).  
The NEER in this paper is defined in foreign currency unit per renminbi (RMB) i.e. an increase in this 
variable corresponds to an appreciation of the RMB.  The Taylor rule (even in this augmented form) 
was however originally modelled for the US economy. While it has been used extensively for other 
developed economies, it may not be appropriate in the Chinese case.  While Xie and Xiong (2003) 
state that the Taylor rule can provide a useful benchmark for measuring the stance of monetary policy 
in emerging economies such as the PRC, the lack of studies in the area points to some difficulty in 
carrying out such research.  Firstly, monetary policy changes in both emerging and transition 
economies can lack consistency and credibility, often when the economy is undergoing an extensive 
process of reform, with many emerging markets undertaking major market oriented reform.  There is 
also the reliance of intermediate targets as well as the use of a battery of different instruments, which 
would ultimately make the interest rate an ineffective measure of the PBOC’s monetary policy stance.   
While the majority of emerging market economies have adopted explicit inflation targeting regimes, 
the PRC would seem to be an exception to this and no explicit inflation targeting regime has ever 
been announced by the PBOC (Hutchinson et al. 2013).  Instead, the PRC operates a pegged or quasi 
pegged (to the US dollar) exchange rate regime which is supported by capital controls7.  This adds to 
the problem of modelling monetary policy reactions in the PRC. Financial markets in emerging 
economies are also often underdeveloped and interest rates are often distorted by the monetary 
                                                          
7 While officially this dollar peg (introduced in 1994) was abandoned in 2005, Morrison and Labonte (2013) 
argues that China’s exchange rate mechanism remains, in practice, a tightly managed currency peg against the 
dollar.  In July 2015, The Financial Times also reported that despite progress on reforms since 2005, 
intervention remains a daily reality (accessed at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1e0a2620-3039-11e5-8873-
775ba7c2ea3d.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3giyhsTxL) 
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authority (Xie and Xiong 2003).  The PRC is no different and it is widely accepted that the PBOC 
directly controls commercial bank decisions.   
Another issue which arises in the Chinese case is the problem of structural breaks, instability 
or non-linearity which can arise in a monetary policy reaction function.  This non-linearity can arise 
from both the preference function of the Chinese authorities and the structure of the Chinese economy 
(Girardin et al. 2014).  Due to these issues with Chinese economic data, standard constant parameter 
models such as traditional Taylor rules or McCallum rules would not adequately define the dynamics.  
As pointed out by Ma (2014), it is typical for emerging economies to experience structural change 
during periods of financial and economic reform which will ultimately lead to regime changes in 
monetary policy.  Most of the literature in this area has focused on nonlinear price rules or quantity 
rules but very few have examined nonlinearities in the context of a calculated monetary policy index 
which replicates the monetary stance of a central bank  With these arguments in mind this paper 
models an augmented Taylor rule as the linear benchmark  as; 
𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑡 = 𝑎 − 𝑏(𝜋𝑡−1 −  𝜋𝑡
∗) − 𝑐(?̅?𝑡−1) − 𝑑∆𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡8      (3) 
As in Equations 1 and 2 (𝜋𝑡 −  𝜋𝑡
∗) is the deviation of inflation from its target, 𝑦𝑡 is the output gap 
and Δ𝑒𝑟𝑡 is changes in the nominal exchange rate of the RMB.  Notice that 𝑖𝑡 has been replaced with 
the monetary policy index 𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑡.  This variable is intended to represent both the quantitative and 
qualitative tools available to the PBOC9.  Another important point to note is the sign of the 
coefficients.  The nature of the MPI’s calculation means that an increase in the index corresponds to 
expansionary monetary policy and a decrease to a contractionary policy.  Therefore the expected signs 
will be the opposite of those observed by the standard theory.  
 
                                                          
8 We can consider ϵt in this equation to represent a zero mean error term that captures deviations from the 
monetary policy rule.  
9 While many monetary policy rules for the PRC include a representation of changes in M2 as an intermediate 
target, this is not included in the monetary policy rule as the monetary policy index is estimated using changes 
in the money supply and therefore would ultimately provide us with misleading or spurious results due to 
problems such as autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
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4. Data 
4.1 Inflation Gap, Output Gap and Exchange Rate 
The estimations in this paper were calculated using quarterly data from 1994Q1 to 2014Q3  The start 
date was choosen as the Chinese government began to publish inflation targets for the first time in this 
year as part of their reform of the banking and financial sector.   Figure 1 shows the plots all of the 
variables used in the estimations while Table 2 reports the results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) Test10.   All of the variables with the exception of the lending rate pass the test for integration 
of order zero (I~ (0)).  Official quarterly inflation data is available from the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) of the PRC.  The inflation target data was sourced from targets for CPI inflation 
mentioned in various publications of the ‘Report on the Implementation of the “YEAR” Plan for 
National Economic & Social Development and on the “YEAR+1” Draft Plan National Economic & 
Social Development’.  Every year, the National People’s Congress (NPC)11, holds an annual plenary 
session.  For example, the incumbent 12th National People’s Conference are scheduled to meet five 
times, in March of every year from 2013-2018.  At these sessions, the National Development & 
Reform Commission (a macroeconomic management agency under the Chinese State Council, which 
has broad administrative control over the Chinese economy), submit a report which includes 
economic updates, forecast and targets including the inflation rate.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
For the output gap, there are two approaches available for its calculation; the production 
function approach and a filtering approach using a HP filter.  While the latter of these is easy to 
implement, it suffers from the drawback that, unlike the former, it provides no economic 
understanding of the sources of growth. Thus, it is arguably best seen as a complement to the more 
rigorous production function approach (Gerlach and Peng 2006).  Therefore, this papers estimations 
                                                          
10 Adjustments for seasonality are made where appropriate. 
11 The National People's Congress (NPC) is the supreme organ of state power and the national legislature in 
China. 
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use a production function output gap12.  This is available from the Oxford Economics Global 
Economic Databank.  
For the exchange rate, the nominal effective exchange rate is included since the RMB is 
heavily managed and any change in its parity is likely to affect the monetary policy stance.  This 
quarterly data is available from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS).  The RMB exchange 
rate has received a great deal of attention both in the economic literature and in the media.   
Academics such as Koivu (2009) argue that the foundation of Chinese monetary policy has been a 
fixed exchange rate, while politicians and policy makers in the US claim that the PRC intentionally 
suppresses the value of the RMB through massive market intervention to raise the competitiveness of 
its exports.    
As has been mentioned, the PBOC relies on a basket of different policy tools in the conduct 
of monetary policy.  Therefore, a monetary policy index composed of both qualitative and 
quantitative tools is required to accurately examine the stance of the PBOC.  As no data set for 
qualitative tools exists, this will be calculated using a Kalman filter technique. A monetary policy 
index can then be composed based on a weighted average of the changes in both qualitative and 
quantitative tools.  Given the importance of this variable for the analysis of the PRC’s monetary 
policy, Section 4.2 describes the theory, rationale and calculations behind the monetary policy index.     
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
4.2 A Monetary Policy Index for the People’s Republic of China 
4.2.1 The Unobserved Components Model 
Quantifying unobserved variables is a common problem in empirical research.  Often in 
macroeconomics, we come across variables that play an important role in theoretical models, but 
which we cannot observe.  Unobserved component models (UCMs) have been used in economic 
                                                          
12 In the interest of robustness, we also estimated an output gap using a HP filter and real GDP data from the 
NBS to use as a comparison with the production function approach.  This series is available on request  The two 
series were found to be very similar.   
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research in a variety of problems when a variable, supposed to play some relevant economic role, is 
not directly observable.  While a particular variable may not be directly observable, the UCM using a 
Kalman Filter13 allows researchers to predict how this unobserved variable might be behaving. For 
example, unobserved components have been used in modelling agents' reaction to permanent or 
transitory changes in the price level (Lucas 1976), in modelling credibility of the monetary authority 
(Weber 1992) and in measuring the persistence (or long-term effects) of economic shocks (Cochrane 
1988).  The statistical treatment of an unobserved components model is based on the State-Space 
Model (SSM) form.  In the SSM, the unobserved components, which depend on the state vector, are 
related to the observations by a measurement equation.  A transition equation then models the 
dynamics of the unobserved variables or states.  While linear regression models use exogenous 
variables to distinguish the explained variation from the unexplained variation, SSM’s rely on the 
dynamics of the state variables and the linkage between the observed variables and state variables to 
draw statistical inference about the unobserved state.  This allows us to estimate the unknown 
parameters of the model.   The Kalman filter is the basic recursion for estimating the state, and hence 
the unobserved components, in a linear State-Space Model (Harvey et al. 2004).  The useful thing 
about the unobserved components model is that if the unobserved variable is closely linked with an 
observed variable, it is possible to predict the value of that variable from the observed values.  The 
purpose of this technique therefore in this paper, is to make inference about the unobservable policy 
instruments that the PBOC carry out given a set of observable policy instruments. 
We can loosely categorize the monetary policy tools of the PBOC into two categories, 
quantitative and qualitative.   
 Quantitative monetary policy tools, often known as “general tools”, are the instruments used 
most often by advanced central banks and monetary authorities.  These include bank lending and 
deposit rates, reserve requirements, open market operations etc.  The quantitative instruments 
                                                          
13Additional information on this technique can be found in Cuthbertson et al. (1992), Kim and Nelson (1999) & 
Commandeur and Koopman (2007). 
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used in this paper were chosen based on information from various PBOC official publications.  
For example;   
“The monetary policy instruments applied by the PBOC include reserve requirement ratio, 
central bank base interest rate, rediscounting, central bank lending and deposit rate, open market 
operations and other policy instruments specified by the State Council”                                 
PBOC, Monetary Policy Instruments (2015)14. 
 Qualitative monetary policy tools, described as “selective tools”, often involves direct 
administrative pressure on financial players to make them operate consistently with national needs 
(Geiger 2008). This style of institutional coercion is one of the PBOC’s unique characteristics and 
it reflects the PRC’s hierarchical order.  It also makes the monetary policy reactions of the PBOC 
very difficult to quantify and model accurately.  The most well-known of these instruments is 
“window guidance”15, also known as “moral suasion” or “jawboning”. Despite the phrase 
“guidance”, which implies a voluntary aspect in the system, the PBOC have a major influence on 
the lending decisions especially of the four state-owned commercial banks (Ikeya 2002).     
A key consideration of this paper is how to quantify the latter of these two monetary policy tools i.e. 
how to link the unobserved variables (qualitative) to the observed variables (quantitative)? Let us 
suppose that the Chinese money supply (M2)16 changes in a way that would be consistent with a 
certain monetary policy response.  Let’s also assume however, that the standard quantitative policy 
instruments (interest rates, open market operations, reserve requirement rates etc.), that we would 
expect to influence M2, cannot be held accountable for the deviations.  It is therefore logical to 
assume that some unobserved qualitative variables might be responsible for changes in the M2.  Of 
course, this does not mean that all changes in M2 not explained by the measurement equation 
                                                          
14 Accessed at http://www.pbc.gov.cn:8080/publish/english/979/index.html 
15 There are several other direct control instruments that a central bank can use.  These included credit controls, 
(for example lending ceilings and floors), prudential guidelines (informing commercial banks to exercise 
particular care in their operations in order that specified outcomes are realized etc.). 
16 M2 is chosen because qualitative instruments are likely to be reflected on to broad money (Petreski and 
Jovanovic 2013). In this paper, we use quarter on quarter changes in the M2 and this variable is plotted in Figure 
2. 
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variables will be explained by this unobserved variable, as there is probably a lot of noise in the M2 
data.  There is however, likely to be very useful “signal” or “noise free” data.  The Kalman filter is 
therefore used to separate the best signal from the noise.  
 
4.2.2 Set Up of the Unobserved Components Model (UCM) 
First of all, we need to specify the quantitative instruments that will influence M2.  The main 
quantitative policy instruments used by the PBOC are the base (or discount) rate, the reserve 
requirement ratio (RRR) and open market operations (OMO).  Secondly, we include instruments 
based on the nature of the PRC’s financial system.  Since the PRC’s banking and financial institutions 
are dominated by state owned banks, any rate changes can be treated as a monetary policy response 
and so we include both the lending and deposit rates of these institutions.  We also need to include 
any other variable that will have a major influence on the level of M2. Therefore, both real GDP and 
the nominal effective exchange rate are included in the measurement equation17.  
Equation 4 and 5 describe both the measurement and transition equations respectively.  
Quarter on quarter changes in M2 (𝛥M2) is chosen as the dependent variable in the measurement 
equation because, as mentioned, qualitative instruments are likely to be reflected on to broad money. 
𝛥M2 is then expressed as a function of both the quantitative and the qualitative monetary policy 
instruments used by the PBOC.  The transition equation then models the unobservable qualitative 
instruments as a first-order autoregressive process (AR (1)). The qualitative instrument series is 
                                                          
17 We would expect the quantity of money demanded to be effected by the level of real GDP. Higher real 
income leads to higher expenditure and therefore people hold more money to finance the higher volume of 
expenditure (See for example Romer 2014).  Mundell (1963) stated that the demand for money is likely to 
depend upon the exchange rate in addition to the interest rate and the level of income.  Also, we would expect 
the huge build-up of foreign exchange reserves to be a central factor affecting M2 (see for example Kawai and 
Laberte 2010).  While there is no variable explicitly included to account for the change in foreign reserves, the 
change in these reserves in China is associated with a change in the NEER. For example, in the period 2008-
2009, the increase in reserves was associated with a decline in the nominal effective exchange rate, indicating 
that reserve accumulation may have been used to prevent an appreciation of the RMB. Therefore, the changes in 
the nominal effective exchange rate should capture changes in the foreign reserves. 
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obtained by a Kalman filter estimation of this money demand function.  The two equations are written 
in the following form;  
Measurement equation: 𝛥𝑀2   =   𝛽1 + 𝛽2 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽3 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 +
𝛽4𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽6 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 +  𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽8𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝑒𝑡1 (4) 
 
Transition equation:  𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙 =  𝛽9 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙(−1) + 𝑒𝑡2      (5) 
 
In the above model, the measurement equation, Equation 4, links the quantitative variables 
(𝛽3 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽6 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)
18 and changes in 
the exchange rate and real GDP (𝛽2 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 +𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃) to an unobserved state variable 
(𝛽8𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙). The transition equation then describes the dynamics of this qualitative instrument
19.  This 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙 variable in both Equations 4 and 5 is the vector of the unobserved variables and describe how 
these variables evolve over time.  The error terms 𝑒𝑡1 and 𝑒𝑡2 are the monetary policy shock and the 
shocks to the qualitative instruments respectively.  The set-up of this UCM assumes that the only 
variable affecting the quarter on quarter change in M2 that can have an AR (1) structure is the 
unobserved variable, and treats all other factors as shocks.  While using this assumption to define our 
series for the qualitative variable may at first seem slightly naive, it is justified for the simple reason 
that the key variables which may have an AR (1) structure and still effect changes in M2 have already 
been included in the measurement equation. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the only important 
variables that remains for changes in M2 is this qualitative variables.  The qualitative variable is 
intended to capture PBOC actions such window guidance, bank directives, credit guidance and other 
instructions which are widely regarded to be very important to the PRC’s banking sector. We expect 
that it would influence M2 as it involves the central bank persuading commercial banks to take certain 
steps without itself making any changes to benchmark rates. 
 
                                                          
18 Note the omission of the open market operations (OMO) variables. The variable for OMO moved almost 
exactly with the base (or discount rate). They deviated at the same periods and by the same magnitude and, 
therefore, all the dynamics will be already captured by the base rate.  
19 The starting values for the parameters in the measurement equation were chosen from OLS regression which 
is the standard procedure for an estimation of this type. 
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4.2.3 Estimating the Qualitative Variable 
 
The results of the estimations are as follows;  
 Measurement equation: 𝛥𝑀2 = 7.5∗∗∗ − 0.04 𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 0.32 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 +
0.10 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 1.4∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 0.95∗∗∗ 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 0.05𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙20            
            (6) 
 
Transition equation:  𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙 =  −0.02 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙(−1)       (7) 
 
The measurement equation results show that while the GDP growth rate and changes to the exchange 
rate are correctly signed, their coefficients are not significant.  The base rate and the reserve 
requirement ratio (RRR) are insignificant and also incorrectly signed.  In fact, of all the monetary 
policy tools included in the equation, only the deposit rate is correctly signed and significant.  This 
would suggest that, for the most part, the quantitative variables have played a limited role on the 
Chinese money supply.  This equation would obviously suffer from multicollinearity problems 
however, and so the interpretation of its results must be treated with caution.     
 The transition equation on the other hand will give the prediction of the qualitative 
instruments used by the PBOC.  Technically speaking, the transition equation identifies latent 
autoregressive process of order 1 (i.e. AR(1)) that affects money growth.  The predicted series 
calculated from the estimation can be seen in the bottom centre panel of Figure 2 (Changes in 
Qualitative Instruments).  This series should, broadly speaking, correspond to the “selective” 
monetary policy actions of the PBOC.  As a simple example, the marked increase and decline in the 
1992-95 periods may be accredited to Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour.  The spike in the 2008-09 
periods on the other hand may have captured the stimulus package the PBOC undertook to prevent the 
effects of the financial crisis in the PRC.  Therefore, from a simple observation of the series, it would 
                                                          
20 ***,** and* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
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appear that our ‘qualitative’ variable measure has succeeded in capturing some of the important 
“unobservable” Chinese monetary policy movements.    
4.2.4 Calculating the Index 
Having obtained an estimated series of the qualitative variable, the monetary policy index (MPI) can 
be constructed.  Firstly, the coefficient of variance of the five instruments21, both qualitative and 
quantitative, is calculated and their sum normalised to unity.  The coefficient of variance is a 
statistical measure of the dispersion of data points in a data series around the mean.  It is a useful 
statistic for comparing the degree of variation from one data series to another, even if the means are 
drastically different from each other. This technique allows us to examine and compare the degree of 
variation of the five series.  The coefficient of variance for the five variables can be seen in Table 3.   
We can clearly see that the main monetary policy tools mentioned by the PBOC – deposit rate, 
lending rate discount rate and reserve requirement –play a comparatively minor role and seem to 
change infrequently when compared to our qualitative instrument.  The addition of the qualitative 
instrument variable clearly shows its importance in its role as a monetary policy tool.   
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
This is confirmed by examining the changes in all policy variables (Figure 2) which clearly shows 
that the qualitative instrument variable changes far more frequently than the other four quantitative 
variables.  The final monetary policy index (MPI) is then calculated as a weighted average of the 
changes in the five policy instruments using the coefficient of variance values (see Table 3) as 
weights.  Figure 3 plots the final MPI which will be used in the estimations that follow.  It should be 
noted that an increase in this index corresponds to an expansionary monetary policy stance and a 
decrease to a contractionary stance.  This is due to the setup of the weightings of each of the variables.  
                                                          
21 The five instruments are the four quantitative (deposit rate, lending, base and reserve requirement rate) and 
the estimated qualitative variable.  The estimations in Section 5 begin in 1994 due to the earliest available 
official inflation target.  Due to data availability of all variables involved, both the qualitative instruments and 
monetary policy index are estimated from 1991 however. 
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Therefore, we would expect to see a negative sign on the monetary policy reaction coefficient in the 
monetary policy rule in our estimation. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
5.   Estimations 
 
5.1 Standard OLS Estimations 
The standard OLS monetary policy rule estimation (Equation 2) can be seen in Table 4.  The results 
are not particularly compelling.  Both the deviation in inflation and output from the target and 
potential level respectively are only significant at the 10% level and even then, the coefficients are 
small.  The sign of the inflation gap is also incorrectly signed.  The change in the exchange rate  does 
not have a significant bearing on the dependent variable.  Furthermore, the 𝑅2 is low a 0.1 suggetsing 
that this specification is a poor fit to model the PBOC’s monetary policy reaction to deviations in their 
target levels.  The equation, however does appear to be stable as the SupF test fails to detect the 
presence of structural breaks over the time period.   These results would reiterate the arguments of He 
and Pauwels (2008), Xiong (2012) and Girardin et al. (2014) who all infer that a single interest rate 
rule would not appropriately represent the monetary policy reactions of the PBOC.   
 Using the same standard OLS estimation technique, we can examine if the monetary policy 
index (MPI) improves on the specification of the PRC’s monetary policy rule estimation.  This index 
contains a weighted average of the policy instruments that are used by the PBOC. It includes both 
quantitative and qualitative instruments.  The results of this estimation (Equation 3) can be seen in the 
right hand column of Table 4.  The results of these estimations are also not very compelling.  The 
reaction of the policy index to a deviation in inflation from its target level is again only significant at 
the 10% level and its coefficient is small at 0.11.  The sign on the coefficient is also incorrect.  The 
exchange rate is once again insignificant, however the 𝑅2 is marginally higher than in our previous 
model at 0.17.   
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[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
The validity of the results are however compromised by the presence of a structural break.  This is 
observed by the highly significant value of the SupF test, which indicates a structural break in 
2009Q1.  
 
5.2 Markov Switching Model 
  Many economic time series occasionally exhibit dramatic breaks in their behaviour, 
associated with events such as financial crises or abrupt changes in government policy (Hamilton 
2005).  The PRC, in particular, has experienced tremendous structural changes in recent decades, 
associated with the gradual opening of the economy.  Prices have been liberalised, trade has increased 
extensively, companies have been privatised and the economy has been transformed from one that 
was centrally planned prior to 1978 to a market economy (Brandt and Rawski 2008).  It has also 
experienced several economic shocks, some of which were related to policy measures to liberalise the 
economy (Gerlach and Peng 2006).  The breaks in the time series associated with these events may 
make linear models inappropriate for analysing macroeconomic variables over time.  To account for 
structural breaks, asymmetry and non-linearity, the Chinese monetary policy rule is examined using 
the Markov switching (MS) model of Hamilton (1989, 1990 and 1994).  The MS model is so called 
because the switching mechanism is controlled by an unobserved state variable, 𝑠𝑡, that follows a first 
order Markov chain process.  An interesting feature of the MS model is that the filtered probabilities 
can be interpreted as the agent’s belief that the economy is in one of the possible states that describe 
the economy.  It is also a very useful technique as the unobserved or latent state variable can be linked 
(or at least possibly linked) to an observable event, policy or characteristic. Another key point is that 
the Markov switching model is relatively easy to implement because it does not assume any a priori 
knowledge of an arbitrary time period or event. Instead, the regime classification in this model is 
probabilistic and determined by the data (Kuan 2002). 
By fitting the linear monetary policy rule equation to the Markov switching framework, we get: 
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𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑡 = 𝑎𝑠𝑡 −  𝑏𝑠𝑡(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗) − 𝑐𝑠𝑡(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡
∗) + 𝑑𝑠𝑡𝛥𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡𝑠𝑡     (8) 
Where 𝑒𝑡~i.i.d. N (0,𝜎𝑒,𝑠𝑡
2 ) and with unobserved state 𝑠𝑡, which is assumed to follow a Markov chain 
of order 1 with transition probabilities 𝑝𝑖𝑗.  The transition probability 𝑝𝑖𝑗 gives the probability that 
state i will be followed by state j.  
𝑃𝑖𝑗 = Pr[ 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑗 ∣ 𝑠𝑡−1 = 𝑖 ],       ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 1
𝑀
𝑖−1 ,        ∀𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, … . . 𝑀            (9) 
This is often then written in an (M x M) matrix P, called a transition matrix: 
P = [
𝑝11 𝑝21 ⋯ 𝑝𝑀1
𝑝12 𝑝22 … 𝑝𝑀2
⋮ ⋮ ⋯ ⋮
𝑝𝑀𝑀 𝑝2𝑀 ⋯ 𝑝𝑀𝑀
]                 (10) 
The row i, column j element of P is the transition probability 𝑝𝑖𝑗. To demonstrate, in the above matrix 
(10), the row 2 column 1 element gives the probability that State 1 will be followed by State 2.  Let us 
for example, say that at time t , the state of the economy 𝑠𝑡 is classified as contractionary monetary 
policy in 𝑠𝑡= 1 or expansionary monetary policy in 𝑠𝑡 = 2.  In our estimation, let us assume that the 
model gives us a probability of 95% of being 𝑝11 and 5% of being 𝑝21.  What these values tell us is 
that if the economy is in a state of expansionary monetary policy the previous period, it tends to stay 
in a expansionary monetary policy state with a very high probability of 95%.  On the other had the 
probability of being in a expansionary monetary policy state in the previous period and switching to a 
contractionary monetary policy state is low at just 5%.    
The estimation of the model depends on maximum likelihood.  The maximization of 
likelihood function of the model requires an iterative estimation technique to obtain estimates of the 
parameters of the model and the transition probabilities22.  With the parameters identified, it is then 
possible to estimate the probability that the variable of interest is following a particular regime.  It is 
also possible to derive the smoothed state probabilities which indicate the probability of being in a 
particular regime or state.    Before estimating the Markov switching monetary policy rule, the 
                                                          
22 For more details on these technique and the maximum likelihood see Hamilton (1989, 1994) and 
Kim and Nelson (1999) 
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number of states or regimes to be included in the model must be chosen.  As there are often relatively 
few transitions among states, it is difficult to estimate strictly exogenous explanatory variables 
accurately.  For this reason, most applications assume only two or three states (Hamilton 2005).  Tests 
for both a two-state and three-state Markov switching IS curve were carried out.  The three-state 
specification was rejected against the two-state specification since the data points are detected only in 
the first and second states.   
Table 5 presents the results of the Markov switching monetary policy rule and Figure 4 plots 
the states recognised by the model with the three monetary policy target variables used in the 
estimation.  The model characterises the monetary policy reaction into two different states – State 1 
and State 2.  In State 1, as in the previous estimations of this paper, the inflation gap seems to play no 
significant role in the monetary policy reaction of the PBOC.  The coefficient is only significant at the 
10% level and is incorrectly signed.  Changes in the exchange are also not statistically significant in 
State 1.  The output gap on the other hand is highly significant with a coefficient of -0.54.  A 1% S.D. 
in the output gap results in a 0.55% deviation in the monetary policy index.  The summary statistics in 
the Appendix indicate that State 1 is, for the most part, characterised by a negative output gap (with a 
mean of -0.5%) and a positive or appreciating exchange rate (with a mean of 3.7%). 
 In State 2, the inflation gap is again insignificant and incorrectly signed.  The output gap has 
now switched from being significant and correctly signed to being insignificant and incorrectly 
signed.  What is perhaps most interesting is that the exchange rate is now highly significant with a 
coefficient of 0.05.  A 1% S.D. in the exchange rate results in a 0.34% deviation in the monetary 
policy index.  The summary statistics in the Appendix show that State 2 is characterised mostly by a 
negative output gap (with a mean of -0.9%) and mostly a negative or depreciating exchange rate (with 
a mean of -0.2%). 
 The results of our MS estimations paint an interesting picture about the monetary policy 
reaction function in the PRC.  First of all, the PBOC seem to have been very accommodative of 
inflation over the estimation period as the inflation gap was not found to have any significant effect on 
the monetary policy index across either state.  This can be attributed to the fact that the inflation gap 
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was predominately negative over the estimation period.  The output gap is only significant in State 1, 
when the exchange rate is appreciating and not targeted by the PBOC’s basket of policy instruments.  
On the other hand, in State 2 the output gap is no longer significant.  During this state, changes in the 
exchange rate are highly significant and, on average, the exchange rate is depreciating.  As it is almost 
universally accepted that the RMB was undervalued over the entire estimation period23, any 
depreciation of the RMB could possibly be viewed as an intervention by the PBOC to maintain the 
RMB at a desired level.  When the exchange rate is “managed” in this way, adjustments in terms of 
trade or exchange rate cannot be used to mitigate the impact of external shocks.  Under this regime, 
increases in the cost of sterilization24 following a sudden decline in foreign interest rates further 
constrain the central bank’s ability to stabilize the economy (Chang et al. 2014). 
 Based on the results of the estimations in this section, it is quite reasonable to suggest that 
when the PBOC do not intervene heavily in the foreign exchange market and allow the RMB to 
appreciate it retains its ability to stabilise the level of output through its monetary policy instruments.  
However, when the PBOC intervene in the foreign exchange market to maintain the RMB at a desired 
level, they surrender this stabilisation channel.  This loss is possibly linked to the cost of the 
sterilisation process.  The surrender of an effective output stabilisation channel could have a profound 
effect on the stability of the Chinese economy, particularity as it enters a new era of reform intended 
on introducing a more balance domestic led growth model.  The current policy could cause the PBOC 
to react in an inappropriate or counterproductive manner to certain shocks to aggregate demand due to 
the constraints caused by the exchange rate policy.  This can be examined further by looking at the 
state coefficients and summary statistics in Table 5 and the Appendix respectively.  In State 1, the 
PBOC actually operated a paradoxical monetary policy response i.e. adopted contractionary monetary 
policy (mean of MPI of -1%) when output was below potential and the economy was operating below 
capacity, in favour of maintaining the exchange rate at the desired level.   This trade-off that the 
PBOC face between maintaining a stable level of output and maintaining the exchange rate at a 
                                                          
23 Chang and Shao (2004), Coudert and Couharde (2007) and Tang (2015) all discuss the nature and extent of 
China’s currency undervaluation. 
24 Sterilisation is a process by which a monetary authority seeks to limit the effect of inflows and outflows of 
capital on the money supply 
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desired level is a classic example of the impossible trinity problem which has been widely discussed 
in the literature (see for example Goodfriend and Prasad 2006, Prasad 2009, Aizenman et al. 
2010)   
  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
 
6. Robustness Test 
In this section, we undertake a robustness test to add reliability and credence to the findings of 
our Markov switching model.  We attempt to do this by estimating a more simple, if not arbitrary, 
examination of the Chinese monetary policy rule.  This is done by estimating a breakpoint model. The 
seminal work of Chow (1960) and Quandt (1960) developed the testing procedure for structural 
changes in a time series at a single specified (hence known) break date. Bai and Perron (1998), (2003) 
developed this technique further and attempted to develop methods that allow for estimation and 
testing of structural change at unknown break dates. While this technique lacks many of the 
advantages of the MS model25, it is none the less a useful robustness check of the validity of our 
findings and interpretations. 
The breakpoint model of Bai-Perron can be used to estimate multiple structural changes in a 
linear model estimated by least squares.  It treats the number of breakpoints and their locations as 
unknown.  Applying this procedure to the augmented monetary policy rule with the calculated index, 
again used as the dependent variable, gives us the following equation with 𝑚 breaks; 
 
                                                          
25 For example, it does not allow for switching between different states of the economy.  Therefore breakpoint 
model can tell us how the dynamics of a particular variable are changing over time.  However, macroeconomic 
relationships do not just change over time, but may also display distinct patters under different states or regimes.  
Therefore this technique should be used as a complement to the MS model. 
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𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑡 =  𝑎1 − 𝑏1(𝜋𝑡−1 −  𝜋𝑡
∗) − 𝑐1(?̅?𝑡−1) − 𝑑1∆𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 𝑡 = 1, … . . , 𝑇1          (11) 
⋮ 
𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑡 =  𝑎𝑚 − 𝑏𝑚(𝜋𝑡−1 −  𝜋𝑡
∗) − 𝑐𝑚(?̅?𝑡−1) − 𝑑𝑚∆𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡  𝑡 = 𝑇𝑚+1, … . . , 𝑇       (12) 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
The results of the breakpoint test can be found in Table 6. As in the results in Table 4, the test detects 
a single breakpoint at 2009Q126.   
The breakpoint model results seem to confirm the findings of the MS model that the PBOC seem 
to have been very accommodative of inflation over the estimation period as the inflation gap was not 
found to have any significant effect on the monetary policy index.  In Period 1 (1994Q2-2009Q1), the 
coefficient on the output gap is high in both significance and magnitude.  However, the sign on this 
coefficient is incorrectly found to be positive which would indicate that the PBOC actually undertook 
paradoxical monetary policy responses in this period.  While this logic seems counter intuitive, the 
coefficient on the exchange rate may provide an explanation for this.  Changes in the nominal 
effective exchange rate are highly significant with a coefficient of 0.23.  A 1% S.D. in the exchange 
rate leads to a very strong change of 2.1% in the monetary policy index.  This suggests that the PBOC 
responded very strongly to any deviations in the level of exchange rate during this period.  This is an 
interesting finding as it suggests that the PBOC’s preference for controlling the movements in the 
exchange rate may have limited an appropriate response to deviations in the level of output.  This is in 
line with our findings from Section 5.  In Period 2 (2009Q2-2014Q3) the exchange rate variable has 
gone from being highly significant in Period 1 to insignificant.  What is interesting is that the 
coefficient on the output gap is now highly significant and correctly signed.  A 1% S.D. in the output 
gap leads to a 0.16% change in the monetary policy index.   At first glance, one could argue that this 
structural break points to a more traditional central bank reaction function that targets the level of 
output and puts less emphasis on the exchange rate and may even point to a more independent and 
autonomous monetary authority.  This may not be the case however.  First of all, in early 2009, the 
                                                          
26 Although the multiple breakpoint model is designed to pick up several breaks, only one is detected at 2009Q1. 
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size of China’s foreign exchange intervention and reserve accumulation fell sharply as capital inflows 
slowed and the trade surplus narrowed due to the effects of the Global Financial Crisis.  This meant 
that maintaining the RMB at a certain level was no longer the main focus of the monetary policy 
reaction.   
7.  Conclusion 
The motivation of this paper was to examine the monetary policy reaction in the PRC by estimating a 
selection of augmented “Taylor type” monetary policy rules.  The standard OLS estimation with the 
lending interest rate set by the PBOC as the dependent variable seems to be a very poor fit to the 
monetary policy reaction function of the PBOC.  This result is not surprising and seems to support the 
arguments that the PBOC use a mixture of quantitative and qualitative monetary policy instruments.  
The inclusion of the monetary policy index as the dependent variable improves the specification 
slightly, but this estimation was found to contain structural breaks.   
Therefore, a non-linear model which allows dynamic switching between different states is 
employed to the augmented monetary policy rule.  The Markov switching model characterised the 
PBOC’s monetary  policy reaction into two states,  First of all, the results indicated that the PBOC 
were accommodative of inflation over the entire estimation period of 1994-2014.  This is in line with 
Mehrotra and Sanchez-Feng (2010) who argue that as the inflation gap has been mostly negative over 
the last twenty years, inflationary pressure has not been of huge concern to the PBOC.  In State 1 of 
the model, the PBOC reacts strongly and appropriately to deviations in output from its potential level.  
Changes in the exchange rate do not have a significant effect on the monetary policy index in this 
state.  In State 2, the PBOC no longer reacts appropriately to the output gap but instead responds to 
deviations in the nominal effective exchange rate.  What is most interesting about the results of the 
MS estimations is that in State 1, the NEER appreciates while it State 2 it depreciates.  As the RMB 
was considered undervalued throughout the estimation period, a depreciation in its value can be seen 
as intervention on behalf of the PBOC.   
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A robustness test in the form of a breakpoint model was estimated to test the validity of our 
findings. A single breakpoint was detected in 2009Q1.  Prior to this breakpoint (i.e. 1994Q2-2009Q1), 
the PBOC seemed to adopt counterintuitive monetary policy responses i.e. they expanded (contracted) 
monetary policy when output was operating above (below) potential.  While this policy seems 
illogical, the highly significant reaction of the policy index to changes in the NEER in the same period 
seem to indicate that the PBOC’s exchange rate policy may have prevented the appropriate policy 
response to deviations in output from its potential level.  After the breakpoint (2009Q2-2014Q4) this 
dynamic changed however.  The exchange rate no longer had a significant effect on the MPI while 
changes in the level of output did.  This is not attributed to the increased independence of the PBOC 
but instead to the slowdown in capital inflows as a result of the financial crisis and the fiscal stimulus 
package introduced in 2008 by the state council which was strongly linked to monetary policy.  The 
empirical results of this paper therefore seem to indicate that the PBOC lose the monetary policy 
transmission channel in terms of output stabilisation during periods when they intervene in the foreign 
exchange market to maintain the exchange rate at a desired level.  This argument points to the 
impossible trinity problem.  
While the estimations in this paper by no means provide a definitive model of Chinese 
monetary policy, some constructive conclusions can still be drawn from the empirical results of the 
estimations.  First of all, in agreement with Goodfriend and Prasad (2006), Goldstein and Lardy 
(2007) and Chang et al. (2014), the results would suggest that China’s quasi-fixed exchange rate 
regime has the potential to restrain the PBOC from conducting independent and appropriate monetary 
policy.  As the PBOC would have to increase the money supply to maintain the exchange rate at a 
desired level, it may cause them to avoid reacting to deviations in the output gap in an appropriate 
manner.  This could ultimately lead to the Chinese economy being exposed to significant risk of 
macroeconomic instability.  The main policy recommendation from the results suggest that the PBOC 
should be granted increased monetary policy independence to mitigate against the adverse effects of 
external shocks which would disrupt macroeconomic stability.  This would be complimented by 
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continued reform in the financial and banking sector in China and, perhaps most importantly, further 
flexibility of the RMB. 
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APPENDIX – SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 
 
 
 OLS Estimations Markov Switching Model Robustness Test 
 1994Q2-2014Q3 State 1 State 2 Period 1 
(1994Q2-2009Q1) 
Period 2    
(2009Q2-2014Q3) 
 
Mean of output gap   
 
-0.7% 
 
 
-0.5%                          
 
-0.9%             
 
-0.9%                          
 
-0.2%             
Standard deviation of output gap 1.7% 1.4% 1.8% 1.9% 0.7% 
Mean of inflation gap                                  -0.7% -1.5% -0.7% -0.6% -0.4% 
Standard deviation of  inflation gap 1.7% 2.4% 3.8% 3.8% 1.3% 
Mean of monetary policy index                                 -0.3% -1.0% 0.2% -0.4% -0.4% 
Standard deviation  monetary policy index                                1.3% 1.4% 1.1% 1.2% 1.3% 
Mean of ∆ in nominal effective exchange rate 0.3% 3.7% -0.2% -0.5% 1.6% 
Standard deviation of  nominal effective exchange rate 9.7% 5.5% 7.4% 10.9% 4.1% 
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Tables 
Table 1.  Monetary Policy Tools of the People’s Bank Of China 
 
 
(a) Price Based  Instruments 
 
Interest rates on 
bank deposits & 
lending 
The People’s Bank of China’s (PBOC) benchmark deposit rate is the “ceiling” interest 
rates bank pay for deposits.  The lending rate is the “floor” of the rates banks earn from 
loans.  In recent years, the PBOC has made plans to further liberalize the interest rates 
by gradually phasing out the benchmark deposit and lending rates.  This would allow for 
a more market-based monetary policy implementation framework. 
 
Refinancing to 
commercial banks 
In its earlier years, the PBOC lent to specialized banks (see Section 5.1) and the PBOC 
also allocated a borrowing quota for each bank every year.  In recent years, the PBOC 
began to use the refinancing policy instrument to ensure financial stability and help 
economic transformation during the “Second Reform Era”. 
 
 
(b) Quantity Based  Instruments 
 
Reserve 
Requirement 
Ratio (RRR) 
Introduced by the PBOC in 1984, the RRR has been increasingly used in recent years as 
a key policy instrument to control liquidity in the financial system and restrict relatively 
rapid growth of monetary and credit aggregates in the economy. 
 
Open Market 
Operations 
(OMO’s) 
OMOs, the purchase and sale of securities on the open market by the PBOC, were first 
introduced as a monetary instrument in 1993. Since 1998, with actions taken by the 
PBOC to develop the interbank bond markets, OMO’s have represented a critical 
instrument for the conduct of monetary policy in China. 
 
 
Capital Controls 
 
 
 
 
This is related to foreign exchange intervention (below).  The aim of this policy 
instrument differs in that its aim is not to control credit allocation, but instead to 
quantitatively limit the financial flows between China and the rest of the world. 
 
(c) Less observable instruments 
 
Foreign exchange 
intervention 
 
 
 
 
In simple terms, this involves controlling the level of the RMB through selling the 
domestic currency and buying foreign currencies to keep the foreign-exchange value 
lower than it would otherwise be.  This policy has received a huge amount of attention, 
particularly from the US, who have labelled the process “currency manipulation”. 
Window 
Guidance 
 
 
 
 
This is the policy of the Chinese government persuading the PBOC and financial 
institutions to follow official guidelines.  This can involve directing financial institutions 
on who and how much to lend. e.g. lending to certain sectors or industries, state owned 
enterprises etc. 
 
 
Admin  measures This would include set limits on the price (interest rate controls) or the quantity (credit 
ceilings) of bank borrowing and lending operations.  There has been a degree of 
liberalisation in this area however.  For example limits on lending rates were removed in 
2004 and 2013 leaving the ceiling deposit rate as the only remaining regulated interest 
rate. 
 
Source: Frankel (2006), PBOC website, Bell and Feng (2013), Geiger (2008) and author’s research. 
  
37 
 
 
Table 2.  Monetary Policy Rule Unit Root Test (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) 
 
 
Variable 
 
1 lag 
 
2 lags 
 
3 lags 
 
4 lags 
 
5 lags 
Output Gap -2.60***    
(0.00) 
-2.35 *   
(0.02) 
-2.04**  
(0.04) 
-2.26** 
(0.02) 
-2.36** 
(0.02) 
Inflation Target -3.88***   
(0.00) 
-5.55*** 
(0.00) 
-7.77*** 
(0.00) 
-3.78 ** 
(0.01) 
-3.33 ** 
(0.02) 
Interest Rate   
(Lending) 
-1.35         
(0.60) 
-1.40      
(0.58) 
-1.42      
(0.57) 
-1.33     
(0.61) 
-1.47     
(0.54) 
∆  Interest Rate 
(Lending)  
-4.63***   
(0.00) 
-4.08*** 
(0.00) 
-4.07*** 
(0.00) 
-3.20** 
(0.02) 
-3.22** 
(0.02) 
Monetary Policy Index -5.28***   
(0.00) 
-4.53*** 
(0.00) 
-4.77*** 
(0.00) 
-3.09** 
(0.03) 
-2.6*     
(0.09) 
Δ in Exchange Rate -4.99***   
(0.00) 
-6.36*** 
(0.00) 
-9.71*** 
(0.00) 
-2.80*   
(0.06) 
-4.44     
(0.00) 
Notes: 1% and 5% P-values are -3.52 and -2.90 for test with a constant.  Rejection of the unit root hypothesis at 
the 10, 5 & 1% level is indicated with *, ** & ***. P-values are in parenthesis. 
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Table 3.  Coefficient of Variance of Policy Variables 
 
Index Deposit  Lending  Base RRR Qualitative  
 
𝑴𝑷𝑰𝒕 
 
0.20 
 
0.09 
 
0.16 
 
0.12 
 
0.43 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. Notes: The coefficients have been normalised. 
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Table 4.   Monetary Policy Rule Estimation - OLS Estimation 
(1994Q2-2014Q3) 
 
 
Variable 
Interest Rate                                        
(2) 
Monetary Policy Index                               
(3) 
Dependent Variable: Δ Interest Rate (24) and MPI (25) 
Constant -0.01                             
(0.01) 
 
-0.01                                            
(0.01) 
Inflation Gap 0.03*                              
(0.02) 
 
0.11*                                 
(0.07) 
Output Gap -0.04*                                 
(0.02) 
-0.20**                                 
(0.09) 
 
Δ in Exchange Rate 0.01                                       
(0.01) 
 
0.03                                       
(0.02) 
 
𝐑𝟐 0.1 0.17 
DW Statistic 1.4 1.7 
SupF Stat 14.8                              
(no break) 
28.0***                         
(2009Q1) 
Notes: ***,** and * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively.  HAC standard errors are in 
parenthesis. 
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Table 5.  Monetary Policy Rule  with Markov Switching Model 
(1991Q2-2014Q3) 
 
 
Variable 
 
State  1                                          
 
State 2                         
Dependent Variable: Estimated Monetary Policy Index (MPI) 
Constant -0.01***                              
(0.01) 
 
-0.01*                              
(0.01) 
Inflation Gap  0.29*                            
(0.17) 
 
0.01                             
(0.16) 
Output Gap -0.54***                            
(0.19) 
 
0.11                             
(0.13) 
Δ in Exchange Rate -0.01                          
(0.05) 
 
0.05***                             
(0.03) 
𝐩
𝟏𝟏
 0.63  
𝐩
𝟏𝟐
 0.37  
𝐩
𝟐𝟏
  0.28 
𝐩
𝟐𝟐
  0.72 
Duration of State 2.7 quarters 3.5 quarters 
Notes: ***,** and * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively.  Standard errors are in parenthesis 
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Notes: ***,** and * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. HAC standard errors are in 
parenthesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Robustness Test Monetary Policy Rule (MPI) with Multiple 
Breakpoints (1991Q2-2014Q3) 
 
 
Variable 
Period 1                                         
(1994Q2-2009Q1) 
Period 2                               
(2009Q2-2014Q3) 
Dependent Variable: Monetary Policy Index (MPI). Break Date 2009Q1 
Constant -0.08***                              
(0.01) 
-0.15***                              
(0.01) 
Inflation Gap -0.07                            
(0.12) 
0.15*                             
(0.07) 
Output Gap 1.06**                            
(0.40) 
-0.29***                             
(0.04) 
Δ in Exchange Rate 0.23***                          
(0.01) 
0.02                             
(0.02) 
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Figure 1.   All Relevant Estimation Variables 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), IMF International Financial Statistics, Oxford 
Economics & author’s calculations 
 
 
Figure 2.  Changes in PBOC Policy Instruments 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) & authors calculations 
 
 
Figure 3.  Estimated Monetary Policy Index (MPI) 
Source: Authors Calculations 
 
 
Figure 4.  Monetary Policy Targets & State Classification 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Oxford Economics & author’s calculations 
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